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The intensely social lifestyle of the human species requires 
that people are constantly monitoring each other’s intentions, 
beliefs, desires, and other mental states. Over the last three 
decades, developmental psychologists have studied how 
mind-reading skills begin to unfold in early childhood. The 
vast majority of these studies have employed variations of the 
false-belief task pioneered by Wimmer and Perner (1983). In a 
false-belief task, the child witnesses an agent interacting with 
an object and then storing it in location A. Next, in the dis-
placement phase of the task, the agent leaves the scene, or is 
otherwise distracted, and the object is transferred to a second 
location, B. Lastly, in the test phase of the task, the experi-
menter must establish whether the child realizes that the agent 
mistakenly believes that the object is still in location A. This 
can be tested in a variety of ways, for example, by asking the 
child where the agent will look for the object (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), by tracking 
the child’s eye gaze to see whether he or she is looking at loca-
tion A or B in anticipation (Clements & Perner, 1994; South-
gate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007) or shows surprise if the agent 
heads for location B (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Song 
& Baillargeon, 2008), or by engaging the child to help the 
agent (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Southgate, 
Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010).
There are two main types of false-belief task: verbal and 
nonverbal. In verbal designs, such as Wimmer and Perner’s 
(1983), the experimenter crucially relies on linguistic means to 
interact with the child, present the story, and so on. In nonver-
bal designs, by contrast, language either is not used at all or is 
merely supplementary to what is chiefly a nonlinguistic mode 
of interaction and presentation.
Although literally hundreds of studies have shown that, by 
and large, children fail at verbal false-belief tasks prior to age 
4 years, a considerable number of recent articles have reported 
that toddlers and even infants pass all kinds of nonverbal false-
belief tasks (see Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010, for a review). 
What is one to make of this discrepancy? This question has 
been answered in various ways. Clements and Perner (1994) 
maintained that the two types of false-belief task probe differ-
ent kinds of understanding. In their view, nonverbal and verbal 
tasks require implicit and explicit understanding, respectively, 
and the former precedes the latter in development. In a similar 
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The experimental record of the last three decades shows that children under 4 years old fail all sorts of variations on the 
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spirit, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) hypothesized that there are 
two mind-reading systems: an early-developing system for 
tracking belief-like states that guides children’s looking behav-
ior, and a later-developing system that guides children’s explicit 
judgments about beliefs. Baillargeon and her colleagues (2010) 
contended that verbal tasks involve two mental processes that 
are not implicated in nonverbal tasks: a process of response 
selection and a process of inhibition of what is sometimes 
called “the pull of the real”—a prepotent tendency to answer 
the test question on the basis of one’s own knowledge about the 
facts (for a recent review of these and other dualist accounts, as 
well as a new proposal, see de Bruin & Newen, 2012).
All these explanations have two things in common. One is 
that they presuppose a qualitative difference between the men-
tal mechanisms needed for solving verbal and nonverbal tasks. 
The second commonality is precisely that these explanations 
are cast directly in terms of mental processes and representa-
tions rather than starting with a proper analysis of the tasks 
as such. We adopted an alternative approach that makes 
minimal assumptions about children’s cognitive abilities and 
focuses instead on the differences between the two types of 
false-belief task.
Our point of departure is that already before their first birth-
day, children are naturally inclined to track other people’s per-
spectives. This ability allows infants to anticipate another 
person’s actions, even when their predictions are based on false 
information (cf., e.g., Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Senju, 
Southgate, Snape, Leonard, & Csibra, 2011). This finding 
is not controversial anymore. In contradistinction to the dualist 
theories discussed previously, our approach requires only mini-
mal assumptions about this ability. To say that children can 
track another person’s perspective is merely to say that they 
can form expectations about that person’s actions based on 
observations of his or her behavior. What kinds of mental pro-
cesses and representations underwrite this capacity is largely 
irrelevant to our project. For example, it is immaterial whether 
this capacity involves explicit representations of beliefs 
(Perner, 1991, 2010), whether it undergoes a conceptual change 
around age 4 years (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001), or whether it involves just one system 
for mind reading or several (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Scholl 
& Leslie, 1999). The only assumption that is critical to our 
approach is that perspective tracking depends to some extent 
on cognitive resources and is therefore more susceptible to dis-
ruption in children than in adults.
One rather blatant difference between verbal and nonverbal 
false-belief tasks is that the former are inherently more com-
plex in that they require the integration of linguistic informa-
tion, whereas the latter do not. However, if our hypothesis is 
correct, the lack of language skills is not the only reason why 
children under 4 years old fail verbal false-belief tasks. As 
well as imposing weaker linguistic demands (if, indeed, they 
impose any), nonverbal false-belief tasks are normally 
designed to minimally interfere with children’s natural ability 
to track events from the agent’s point of view, whereas verbal 
false-belief tasks tend to disrupt this process in various ways. 
For example, nonverbal false-belief tasks generally feature a 
single protagonist, whereas verbal false-belief narratives typi-
cally include more than one character. Given that tracking two 
perspectives is more demanding than tracking one, this differ-
ence goes some way toward explaining why children perform 
better in nonverbal tasks than in verbal tasks. Speaking more 
generally, we hypothesize that, for a child’s perspective-tracking 
ability to work effectively, it should be disturbed as little as 
possible, especially in young children.1
To illustrate our key point, we will briefly compare the 
studies that have come to exemplify the two main experimen-
tal paradigms. The method and design of Onishi and Baillar-
geon’s (2005) nonverbal false-belief task was extremely 
simple. Apart from the protagonist and a few props, the stage 
was empty, the experimenter did not interfere with the pro-
ceedings, and the target object was self-propelled, moving 
from box to box of its own accord. In short, there was nothing 
to distract the children’s attention and prevent them from 
tracking the protagonist’s point of view. In stark contrast to 
that minimalist approach, Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) sce-
nario featured two characters (a little boy named Maxi and his 
mother) in a rather elaborate story, told by a recorded voice 
and simultaneously acted out by the experimenter with dolls 
and various other props. During the story, Maxi disappeared 
for a considerable period of time while his mother was baking 
a cake. Finally, as Maxi returned from the playground, the 
experimenter intervened with the key question: “Where will 
Maxi look for the chocolate?”
The complexity of Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) experi-
mental task is clearly an order of magnitude greater than the 
complexity of Onishi and Baillargeon’s task, which goes a 
long way toward explaining why children performed so much 
better on the latter than they did on the former. There are two 
features, in particular, that may have disrupted children’s per-
spective tracking in Wimmer and Perner’s task: It may not 
have been clear who the main character of the story was—
Maxi left the scene for a while, during which time his mother 
held the stage with her baking—and the experimenter switched 
roles from puppeteer to interviewer to spring her question on 
the unsuspecting child. Each of these factors may have drawn 
the younger children away from tracking Maxi’s perspective, 
and their combined effect may have been even greater. Other 
versions of the standard false-belief task impose similar 
demands and are therefore liable to the same sort of criticism.
In their influential meta-analysis, Wellman and his col-
leagues (2001) discussed a number of task variations that have 
been found to improve children’s performance on verbal false-
belief tasks. Most of these are plausibly seen as facilitators for 
perspective tracking. For example, several studies have shown 
that success rates increase when children participate in misdi-
recting the agent, the agent’s mental state is made more 
explicit, or the target object is made less salient, thus reducing 
the pull of the real. It should be noted, however, that in isola-
tion, none of these factors would raise 3-year-olds’ 
 at University College London on August 5, 2014pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Three-Year-Olds Pass the False-Belief Task 29
performance above chance level (Wellman et al., 2001). In our 
view, for these and other task variations to be successful, the 
process of perspective tracking must be allowed to run its 
course throughout the task. This is precisely what we tried to 
do in our study.
The Duplo Task
The protocol for the Duplo task was a variation on the stan-
dard false-belief task. The experimenter showed the child a set 
of Duplo toys (i.e., large Lego toys for small children; Lego, 
Billund, Denmark) that she had on a table: a girl figure, a 
bunch of bananas, and two little yellow cupboards that were 
referred to as “fridges,” one with a blue door and one with a 
red door. The child was told that the girl loved bananas and 
had one for breakfast every morning. This morning, she had 
already had a banana, so she wanted to return the remaining 
ones to the fridge. At this point, the experimenter made the girl 
put the bananas inside one of the two fridges (the choice of 
refrigerator was counterbalanced across participants) and told 
the child that the girl now wanted to go for a walk.
Up to this point, our procedure was the same as in a stan-
dard false-belief task. In the remainder of the task, two novel 
sets of variations were introduced, both intended to help the 
child keep track of the Duplo girl’s perspective. First, we 
made sure that the child could see the Duplo girl throughout 
the session. Hence, rather than making the figure disappear, 
as experimenters had done in earlier studies, our experimenter 
made the Duplo girl walk in the direction of the child and turn 
her back on the scene.2 Then the experimenter asked the child, 
in a secretive manner, “Can the girl see me from where she 
is?” This was only a prompt: If the child did not answer, 
the experimenter filled in, saying, “She surely can’t see me 
from over there.” Then, looking at the child with an expres-
sion suggesting connivance, the experimenter moved the 
bananas from one fridge to the other. At this point, the experi-
menter asked the child, pointing at the girl figure, “She hasn’t 
seen what I did, has she?” This, too, was only a prompt: If the 
child did not answer, the experimenter would say, “No, she 
hasn’t seen what happened!” These prompts were intended to 
help the child keep track of the girl’s perspective.3 For the 
same reason, we had the experimenter move the bananas her-
self, rather than introducing a second character in the story, 
which might result in the child losing track of the protago-
nist’s perspective.
The second set of task variations we introduced was 
intended to help the child keep track of the Duplo girl’s per-
spective during the test phase. Once it had been established 
that the Duplo girl had not seen the experimenter move the 
bananas, the experimenter returned the girl figure back to the 
center of the scene. She placed the figure in front of the two 
fridges, facing the empty space in between, and asked the 
child whether he or she would like to play with the girl now. 
The experimenter encouraged the child to take the lead by 
saying, “What happens next? You can take the girl yourself if 
you want. . . . What is she going to do now?”
Instead of asking the standard false-belief question, “Where 
will the girl look for the bananas?”—which requires a referen-
tial response—we used the open questions “What happens 
next?” and “What is she going to do now?” We also encour-
aged the child to continue acting out the story. This approach 
deviates from the standard one in four ways that are relevant to 
our main hypothesis. First, the standard procedure may be an 
unnatural test for young children in that, up to the false-belief 
question, the experimenter just tells them a story (why then 
start interrogating the child about the protagonist?). In our 
study, the experimenter adopted a more interactive stance 
throughout, and there was no abrupt break between the narra-
tive and response elicitation. Second, act-out responses are 
generally easier for young children than verbal responses are, 
perhaps partly because they make it easier for them to identify 
with the protagonist. Third, unlike the standard question, ours 
did not confront children with a binary choice; a more open 
question should help the child to keep track of the protago-
nist’s perspective rather than having to consider alternative 
options. Finally, whereas the standard question focuses on the 
target object (in our case, the bananas), which might well rein-
force the pull of the real, the questions we asked the child did 
not mention the target object at all. For all these reasons, we 
expected that our procedure would minimize interference with 
perspective tracking.
Given that the only link between the Duplo girl and the 
empty fridge was that she put the bananas in that fridge before 
leaving, we assumed that if a child had the girl figure return to 
the empty fridge, it was because the Duplo girl wanted to fetch 
her bananas. Hence, children’s responses were coded as cor-
rect if they moved the girl figure to the empty fridge and incor-
rect if they moved the Duplo girl to the fridge with the bananas.
In our first experiment, we administered the task as 
described. Then, in two follow-up experiments, we further 
investigated the effects of the two sets of task variations—one 
during the displacement phase and one during the test phase—
intended to help perspective tracking.
Experiment 1
Participants
Twenty-eight children were recruited from a local nursery in 
Salinas (Asturias, Spain). The nursery is part of a public pri-
mary school and serves middle-class families. The children 
had been attending nursery for 3 months. The group consisted 
of 15 girls and 13 boys, and their mean age was 3.5 years 
(range = 3.0–4.0).
Design and procedure
Children were tested individually by the first author in a quiet 
area of their nursery. Each session lasted approximately 10 
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min. All children were tested on two verbal false-belief tasks: 
the standard “Smarties” task (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 
1986) and the Duplo task (in that order).
The Smarties task served as our benchmark because 
Wellman and his colleagues (2001) reported in their meta-
analysis that children performed similarly in the Smarties task 
and the standard displacement false-belief task. Furthermore, 
Wellman and his colleagues showed that even those task varia-
tions that significantly improved children’s performance on 
verbal false-belief tasks did not allow 3-year-olds to go from 
below-chance to above-chance performance, and therefore the 
crucial measure in our study was to compare children’s perfor-
mance on the two tasks to chance level.
Results and discussion
Of the 28 children who participated in the study, 6 failed to 
give a response in the Smarties task. Of the remaining 22 chil-
dren, 5 passed the task, whereas 17 failed it (22.7% success 
rate). In the Duplo task, 1 child failed to cooperate, and 2 chil-
dren gave two responses (i.e., they first moved the girl figure 
toward the empty fridge and then moved it to the fridge with 
the bananas), so data from all 3 were removed from the analy-
sis. Of the remaining 25 children, 20 passed the task, whereas 
5 failed it (80% success rate).4
The critical test of our hypothesis was a comparison 
between children’s performances on the two false-belief tasks 
relative to chance performance. A McNemar test with continu-
ity correction revealed a significant difference in children’s 
performance on the two tasks, χ2(1, N = 19) = 6.750, p < .01. 
Moreover, although children performed significantly below 
chance level in the Smarties task (p < .042, two-choice bino-
mial test, two-tailed), they performed significantly above 
chance level in the Duplo task (p < .005, two-choice binomial 
test, two-tailed).
To test the assumption underlying the correct responses 
(i.e., that, according to the child, the Duplo girl was going back 
to the empty fridge to fetch her bananas), we ran a control true-
belief condition in which the Duplo girl herself moved the 
bananas from one fridge to the other. We tested 14 children 
from the same nursery (6 girls and 8 boys; mean age = 3.10 
years, range = 3.7–4.2). Two children did not cooperate, and a 
third child was eliminated from the analyses because he gave 
two conflicting answers (i.e., he said the girl was going to get 
her bananas but then moved the girl figure to the empty fridge). 
Of the remaining 11 children, 10 moved the girl figure to the 
fridge containing the bananas, and 1 moved it to the empty 
fridge. The preference for the fridge with the bananas was reli-
able (p < .012, two-choice binomial test, two-tailed), which 
supports our interpretation of the false-belief data.
Our results support the hypothesis that 3-year-old children 
are able to pass a verbal false-belief task provided that they are 
allowed to keep track of the protagonist’s perspective. The 
question remains, however, as to which of the two sets of vari-
ations introduced to the standard false-belief task were more 
effective in allowing children to succeed in the task.
Experiment 2a
Participants
Nineteen children were recruited from the same nursery as in 
Experiment 1. Children in this group had been attending nurs-
ery for 2 months. The group consisted of 10 girls and 9 boys, 
and their mean age was 3.5 years (range = 2.10–4.0).
Design and procedure
Testing conditions were the same as in Experiment 1. A similar 
set of Duplo toys was used, and the protocol was the same in 
all but one respect: After the Duplo girl put the target objects 
in one of the two locations on the table, the experimenter made 
the girl figure disappear from the scene by suddenly dropping 
her into a bag of toys under the table. The experimenter did not 
comment on the girl’s disappearance and instead engaged the 
child’s attention by continuing to play with the remaining toys 
on the table. On the basis of our main hypothesis, we expected 
that this manipulation would interfere with children’s ability 
to track the Duplo girl’s perspective and thus diminish their 
performance.
It should be noted that as the experimenter was displacing 
the target object, she acted as secretively as she did in Experi-
ment 1. However, because she did not refer to the Duplo girl 
(or indicate who was being deceived), we assumed that the 
element of deception would not facilitate children’s perspec-
tive tracking in this version of the Duplo task.
Results and discussion
Of the 19 children who participated in the study, 2 did not 
cooperate when they were asked to play with the girl. Of the 
remaining 17 children, 3 passed the task, whereas 14 failed it 
(17.6% success rate). These results reveal below-chance per-
formance (p < .014, two-choice binomial test, two-tailed). A 
chi-square test with Yates correction revealed a significant dif-
ference in children’s performance on the Duplo task in Experi-
ments 1 and 2a, χ2(1, N = 42) = 13.464, p < .001.
These results confirm that the perspective-tracking varia-
tions introduced in the displacement phase of the Duplo task in 
Experiment 1 were crucial to the children’s success. Apparently, 
the perspective-tracking variations in the test phase were not 
sufficient for 3-year-olds to recover from the disruptive effect of 
the Duplo girl’s sudden disappearance in Experiment 2a.
As we expected, having the experimenter act secretively 
did not prevent children from performing below chance level 
when their perspective tracking was disrupted. We suggest 
that to the extent that deception facilitates false-belief reason-
ing (as it may have done in Experiment 1), it does so because 
deception helps children stay tuned to the perspective of the 
character who is being deceived.
Having established that the perspective-tracking variations 
in the displacement phase of the Duplo task enhanced chil-
dren’s performance, we next sought to determine whether 
these variations alone would suffice to enable 3-year-olds to 
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Eighteen children were recruited from the same nursery as in 
Experiments 1 and 2a. The children in this group had been 
attending the nursery for 2 months. The group consisted of 10 
girls and 8 boys, and their mean age was 3.4 years (range = 
2.10–3.9).
Design and procedure
The testing conditions were the same as in Experiments 1 and 
2a. The Duplo toys and the protocol were the same as in 
Experiment 1, with this exception: At the end of the narrative, 
instead of inviting the child to play with the Duplo girl, the 
experimenter kept hold of the figure and asked the child the 
standard false-belief question: “Where will the girl look for 
the bananas?” As in a standard false-belief task, children in 
Experiment 2b had to answer the probe question either ver-
bally or by pointing to one of the two locations.
Results and discussion
Of the 18 children who participated in the study, 4 passed the 
task, whereas 14 failed it (22.2% success rate). Children’s per-
formance was below chance (p < .032, two-choice binomial 
test, two-tailed). A chi-square test with Yates correction 
revealed a significant difference in children’s performance on 
the Duplo task in Experiments 1 and 2b, χ2(1, N = 43) = 11.920, 
p < .002. Moreover, children’s performance in Experiments 2a 
and 2b was comparable, χ2(1, N = 35) = 0.114, p = .735.
These results show that the high performance observed in 
Experiment 1 was contingent on our perspective-tracking vari-
ations in the displacement phase as well as in the test phase. 
Presumably for the reasons discussed previously, the standard 
false-belief question, “Where will x look for y?” throws young 
children off track. This is an important finding because hun-
dreds of studies have used this question as a diagnostic for 
false-belief understanding.5
General Discussion
The aim of our study was to investigate the paradoxical results 
found in the theory-of-mind literature, where it has been 
reported that infants are able to pass nonverbal versions of 
the false-belief task (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005) but children under 4 years old fail myriad 
versions of the verbal false-belief task (Wellman et al., 2001; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Here, we hypothesized that those 
differences were caused, at least partly, by accidental differ-
ences between the tasks that were used to test these two age 
groups: Nonverbal versions of the false-belief task allow 
infants to track a person’s perspective during a sequence of 
events, whereas verbal versions of the task tend to disrupt the 
perspective-tracking process in various ways, which may be 
critical for younger children.
In our study, we used a new verbal false-belief task designed 
to minimize these disruptions. As expected, 3-year-olds (mean 
age = 3.5 years) were able to pass this task, with a success rate 
of 80%. Moreover, their performance in the new false-belief 
task was significantly better than that in a standard task, going 
from below chance to above chance level. Two follow-up 
experiments confirmed that allowing the children to keep track 
of the protagonist’s perspective during the false-belief narra-
tive was crucial to their success. Furthermore, instead of mak-
ing the child choose between the two possible answers to the 
standard probe question, we used open questions inviting the 
child to continue acting out the story.
Rather than trying to solve the theory-of-mind paradox 
by drawing a distinction between different types of mind- 
reading systems or knowledge available to infants and young 
children (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Baillargeon et al., 2010; 
Clements & Perner, 1994; de Bruin & Newen, 2012), we 
assumed only what is evident from the infant studies, namely, 
that from a very early age, children are able to track other peo-
ple’s perspectives. This fundamental ability allows them to 
anticipate other people’s actions, even when their inferences 
are based on false information. What our study shows, in addi-
tion, is that it is relatively easy to interfere with young chil-
dren’s perspective-tracking ability. Therefore, in a laboratory 
setting, it is necessary to take measures to minimize the dis-
ruption of the perspective-tracking process to ensure that 
3-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief task.
The old debate about what changes between ages 3 and 4 
years in theory-of-mind development can be reevaluated in 
light of our findings. How does the perspective-tracking abil-
ity of 3-year-olds develop in order to enable them to pass the 
standard false-belief task at around age 4 years? One possibil-
ity is that with an increase in their executive control comes an 
improved ability to stay tuned to the protagonist’s perspective. 
Although this is highly likely (with school children generally 
having a better capacity to concentrate than preschoolers), we 
have found further evidence suggesting that even adults’ per-
spective tracking can be momentarily interrupted by subtle 
task manipulations (Rubio-Fernández, 2012). The differential 
performance of 3- and 4-year-olds in the standard false-belief 
task is therefore more likely to result from an improvement in 
their capacity to recover from the disruption of their perspec-
tive tracking by task manipulations than from an increased 
capacity to stay with the protagonist’s perspective throughout 
the task.
However, our main concern is not to advocate any particu-
lar view on development. Rather, it is to argue for a reinterpre-
tation of the data. As discussed in the introduction, thus far the 
experimental record has shown that although infants can pass 
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nonverbal versions of the false-belief task, children under 4 
years old have always failed verbal versions of the same task. 
This pattern of results led researchers to postulate a qualitative 
change in development at the end of age 3 years, which all 
dualist theories of false-belief reasoning seek to account for. 
Our findings suggest that this alleged change may be an arti-
fact of widely adopted design features that are extrinsic to the 
verbal task. To be sure, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
a developmental discontinuity may eventually be found, per-
haps at a younger age. But that remains to be seen.
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Notes
1. This is not to imply that introducing a second character will 
always cause children to fail the task. For example, if the experi-
menter who acts as the protagonist creates rapport with the child 
(thus allowing the child to identify with his or her perspective), then 
the introduction of a second character may be less disruptive (cf., 
e.g., Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010). The more general point 
here is that no single factor need be decisive across the board.
2. Although we believe that this manipulation facilitated perspective 
tracking, we do not want to suggest that removing the main character 
from the scene necessarily impedes children’s performance. As sev-
eral infant studies have shown, the mere fact that the protagonist 
temporarily leaves the child’s field of vision does not result in his or 
her losing track of that character’s perspective (see, e.g., Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005). It is important to note, however, that the disrup-
tive effect of the protagonist’s disappearance is likely to be increased 
in verbal false-belief tasks in which the experimenter continues with 
the story and shifts the focus of attention to the secondary character 
(e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
3. Previous studies suggest that introducing deception may help 
young children succeed in verbal false-belief tasks (Chandler, Fritz, 
& Hala, 1989; Sullivan & Winner, 1993; also see Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001). Although the experimenter in our study was clearly 
acting behind the Duplo girl’s back, this manipulation was very 
subtle compared with manipulations in previous studies, in which 
children were asked to join a plot to deceive the protagonist. This 
distinction is important because it means that the issue of whether 
children really understand trickery does not apply here (see Sodian, 
Taylor, Harris, & Perner, 1991).
4. To see whether the older children in our sample performed better 
than did the younger ones, we divided the children into two age 
groups: those under 3.6 years and those 3.6 years or above. The per-
formance of the two groups did not differ significantly in any of the 
four false-belief tasks administered in the study (all ps > .270, chi-
square tests, two-tailed).
5. In their meta-analysis, Wellman and his colleagues (2001) sug-
gested that future research should combine those variations of the 
false-belief task that have been shown to independently improve 
children’s performance up to chance level. We stress that our study 
was not intended to implement this suggestion. In fact, when our own 
task variations were used separately, children performed below 
chance level. The aim of our task was to facilitate perspective track-
ing throughout the experiment, and our results indicate that, indeed, 
no single factor was decisive.
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